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REDISCOVERIES

REMARKS, STOCKDALE TO PILOTS, 1965

Martin L. Cook

Dr. Cook taught at the Naval War College from 2009 to 2016 and is the
Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Professor Emeritus of Professional
Military Ethics at the College. He now serves as a distinguished visiting
professor of philosophy at the U.S. Air Force Academy.

In Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot, his collection of reflective essays
published long after his time in Vietnam, Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale
writes eloquently about the importance of the study of philosophy in helping him
to endure the prisoner of war (POW) experience. While at Stanford completing a
degree in economics, he found his most important questions being deflected by
the economics faculty, often with the remark, “Well, we’re getting into philosophy
now.” Exasperated by that reaction, Stockdale found his way to the Philosophy
Department and embarked on a course of reading in the subject, guided by Professor Philip H. Rhinelander.
As Stockdale was leaving Stanford, Rhinelander gave him a copy of the work
on Roman Stoicism by the freed slave–philosopher Epictetus, which Stockdale read (he says) initially only out of respect for Rhinelander. But Epictetus’s
thoughts clearly stuck with him and, in the end, helped him find the resiliency
and determination to endure the POW experience honorably. The key tenet of
Stoic philosophy is the distinction between what one can control (only one’s own
actions and inner reactions to things) and what one cannot (the actions of others
and the unavoidable circumstances life brings).
Although written well before Stockdale began his POW experience, this
speech to his aircrews en route to Vietnam demonstrates the degree to which he
already was thinking about and articulating what they were about to undergo in
Stoic terms. His discussion about moving up bomb-release altitudes or adding
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fuel reflects exactly the Stoic notion of accepting the mission one is given, realistically and uncomplainingly. His unflinching dismissal of “Hollywood answers”
and straightforward recognition that, as military officers, his listeners do not get
to pick, or even to some degree judge, the war to which they are assigned are a
perfect illustration of recognizing what is within one’s own powers and what is
not. It recognizes that political decisions about where military force is used are
“above the pay grade” of his officers.
Stockdale reminds his listeners, “[Y]ou [are] an actor in a drama that you’ll
replay in your mind’s eye for the rest of your life.” In other words, you are not
the playwright, but how you perform in the play rests entirely in your hands. In
this remark, he is virtually paraphrasing Epictetus (Enchiridion 17): “Remember
that you are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the author pleases to make it.
If short, of a short one; if long, of a long one. If it is his pleasure you should act a
poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally.
For this is your business, to act well the character assigned you; to choose it is
another’s.”
So, in this short address, we see Stockdale the Stoic warrior attempting to
impart Stoic wisdom to his aircrews. It is the perfect illustration of the “operationalization” of the importance of philosophy that he will write about years later
with such eloquence. But already, here, he is attempting to help his aircrews steel
themselves mentally to accept the war and the missions assigned to them unflinchingly, realistically, without illusions. He is, as the Stoics would say, leading
them to live “in accordance with Nature” (kata phusin) by calling things what
they are and calmly facing what lies before them.
Remarks of wing commander James B. Stockdale to the pilots of Carrier Air Wing 16 aboard
USS Oriskany, at sea en route to the Gulf of Tonkin, on April 29, 1965, one week before they
entered combat. Presented as found in the archives of the Naval War College. Excerpted version
available in U. S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (Presidio, 1978).

Having reviewed for you the terrain of Vietnam, the enemy’s order of battle, the
rules of engagement, and to some extent the modern history of the conflict and
the evolution of America’s strategy, I think I owe you in addition a straight-fromthe-shoulder discussion of pilots’ mental attitudes and orientation in “limited
war” circumstances. I saw the need for this last summer aboard Ticonderoga—
after the start of the war had caught us by surprise and we had gone through
those first, exciting days pretty much on adrenaline. In the lull that followed, as
we prepared for a next round, I could sense that those fine young men who had
measured up so well in the sudden reality of flak and burning targets wanted to
talk and get their resources and value systems lined up for the long haul. Like
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most of you, they were well read, sensitive, sometimes skeptical—those educated
in the American liberal tradition to think for themselves—those who are often
our most productive citizens and, just as often, our best soldiers. They realized
that bombing heavily defended targets is serious business and no game—that it is
logically impossible, in the violence of a fight, to commit oneself as an individual
only in some proportion of his total drive and combative instinct. It has to be
all or nothing; dog eat dog over the target. I think they were asking themselves,
as you might—Where do I as a person, a person of awareness, refinement, and
education, fit into this “limited war,” “measured response” concept?
I want to level with you right now, so you can think it over here in mid-Pacific
and not kid yourself into imagining “stark realizations” in the Gulf of Tonkin. Once
you go “feet dry” over the beach, there can be nothing limited about your commitment. “Limited war” means to us that our target list has limits, our ordnance
loadout has limits, our rules of engagement have limits, but that does not mean
that there is anything “limited” about our personal obligations as fighting men to
carry out assigned missions with all we’ve got. If you think it is possible for a man,
in the heat of battle, to apply something less than total personal commitment
—equated perhaps to your idea of the proportion of national potential being
applied—you are wrong. It’s contrary to human nature. So also is the idea I was
alarmed to find suggested to me by a military friend in a letter recently: that the
prisoner of war’s Code of Conduct is some sort of a “total war” document. You
can’t go halfway on that, either. The Code of Conduct was not written for “total
wars” or “limited wars,” it was written for all wars, and let it be understood that it
applies with full force to this air wing, in this war.
What I am saying is that national commitment and personal commitment are
two different things. All is not relative. You classical scholars know that even the
celebrated “free thinker” Socrates was devoted to ridiculing the sophist idea that
one can avoid black and white choices in arriving at personal commitments; one
sooner or later comes to a fork in the road. As Harvard’s philosophy great, Alfred
North Whitehead, said: “I can’t bring half an umbrella to work when the weatherman predicts a 50 percent chance of rain.” We are all at the fork in the road this
week. Think it over. If you find yourself rationalizing about moving your bombrelease altitude up a thousand feet from where your strike leader briefs it, or adding a few hundred pounds fuel to your over-target bingo because “the Navy needs
you for greater things,” or you must save the airplane for some “great war” of the
future, you, you’re in the wrong outfit. You owe it to yourself to have a talk with
your skipper or me. It’s better for both you and your shipmates that you face up
to your fork in the road here at 140 degrees east rather than later, two thousand
miles west of here, on the line.
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Let us all face our prospects squarely. We’ve got to be prepared to obey the
rules and contribute without reservation. If political or religious conviction helps
you do this, so much the better, but you’re still going to be expected to press on,
with or without these comforting thoughts, simply because this uniform commits
us to a military ethic—the ethic of personal pride and excellence that alone has
supported some of the greatest fighting men in history. Don’t require Hollywood
answers to “What are we fighting for?” We’re here to fight because it’s in the interest of the United States that we do so. This may not be the most dramatic way to
explain it, but it has the advantage of being absolutely correct.
I hope I haven’t made this too somber. I merely want to let you all know first
of all where this wing stands on “Duty, Honor, Country.” Secondly, I want to warn
you all of excessive caution. A philosopher has warned us that, of all forms of
caution, caution in love is the most fatal to true happiness. When that Fox flag is
two-blocked in the Gulf, you’ll be an actor in a drama that you’ll replay in your
mind’s eye for the rest of your life. Level with yourself now. Do your duty.
Footnote: No one came forward with reservations. By the time Oriskany returned to San Diego
in December 1965, its pilots had earned a record total of military decorations for Vietnam
carrier deployments. Of the 120 pilots addressed in this talk, thirteen did not return to the ship:
eight were killed in action, one is still unaccounted for, and four—including the speaker—spent
seven and a half years as POWs in Hanoi.
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